A Transylvanian Boundary for Rumania: Notes by Colonel R. Rosetti (Rumanian Army) and Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich

The following notes have been communicated by the President for publication. The first is an extract from a letter writtell by a dirtinguished officer of the Rumanian Army, Colonel R. Rosetti, in criticism of certain passages in the recently published book : ' Boundaries in Europe and the Near East,' by Sir Thomas Holdich, reviewed in the October Journnl. The second note is the author's reply.

I. Extract from letter by Colonel R. Rosetti to Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich.

I. On p. 117 YOU say: "Dobrudgea, which is a weak extension of territory, which adds nothing to the strength of Rumania from the strategic o'r military point of view." I am entirely of a different opinion and maintain that, apart from the ethnographical and economic* points ofview, Dobrudgea is a necessity to Rumania from the strategic point of view. If Dobrudgea did not belong to Rumania it would be ceded to Bulgaria. This would give Bulgaria the advantage of having, for her armies, a zone of concentra- tion from which they could separate easily, at the beginning of operations, Wallachia from Moldavia. Actually a single line of railway unites Dobrudgea to Bulgaria, but the advantages of concentration in Dobrudgea are such that it will decide Bulgaria to build new ones. Wallachia is the greatest and by far the richest part of Rumania, and if Bulgaria con- centrates her armies in Dobrudgea, Wallachia will have to be abandoned, for it will be impossible to concentrate in Wallachia, by the only railway line MBrEseati-Focsani-Buzeu, all the troops from Moldavia and Bessarabia (the line Reni-Galati-Braila being under enemy fire); and besides it would be imprudent to do it, as the enemy would concentrate his forces quicker in Dobrudgea and threaten to cut completely the army from Moldavia and Bessarabia, the distance between Galafi and the Carpathians being only 1 2 0 miles. The only thing to be done would be to concentrate all the Rumanian army in Southern Moldavia and Bessarabia. But this solution also would have two drawbacks : ( a ) It would be impossible to transport from Wallachia all troops, depbts, etc., by the single railroad

'. ' (6) I t would, as I have said above, abandon Bureu-Focsani-MBrLsesti. to the enemy by far the richest part of Rumania.

T o resume : the cession of Dobrudgea, from a military point of view, helps the aggressive policy of Bulgaria and makes it impossible to Rumania to defend herself.

2. Talking about our future Western frontier (the one which would separate us from Hungary), you say (pages 117, 118) : "Wherever the dividing line west of Rumanian Transylvania may be drawn (and there have been several suggestions) there is no prospect of basing it on strong natural features.

This, then, is the great problem for Rumania to solve-whether the gain of three million people and the consequent acces- sion of fighting strength (and it would make of Rumania the most formid- able fighting state in the Near East), combined with the economic advantage accruing from so promising a territory as Transylvania, would be balanced by the possession of an indefensible boundary, beyond which there must ever lie in wait a powerful enemy, anxious to retrieve a lost territory, and only restrained (or not restrained, as the case may be) by coercive influence of greater Powers. The Transylvanian Alps and * Rumania would have no other ice-free port than Constanfa, and studies have shown that it is impossible to build any port between the Dniester and Constanja.

Carpathians are not as the Italian Alps or the Pyrenees, but they form, barrier of inestimable value. Is it wise for nevertheless, a great defel~sive a country which, like Poland, lies between the hammer and the anvil to part with such an advantage ? "

From this it would appear that Transylvania is an open country on its western side. Now this is not the case, and this will make itself apparent by a careful look at a map, which shows that, to the north of the moun- tainous massif of the Banat (whose peaks are over 4000 feet high, Piatra Temenicu being 1447 metres), a powerful system of mountains, named by the Rumanians the Metallic and the Bihor Mountains, forms the western side of Transylvania. These mountains, whose general direction is north- south, go from the Mure: (Maros) to the Same: (Szamos) where they unite with the Lapos Mountains, a branch of the Carpathians. The backbone of these mountains, forming the water divide between Tisa (Theiss) and Mure? and Tames, begins near Deva, on the Mure:, follows heights (in metres) 1046, 1264, 1349, 1497, 1792, 718. The dimensions of this massif are 160 kilometres north to south and 130 kilometres east to west. Except in the valleys of the Mure; to the south of the massif, and Same! to the north of it, only one railway line, from Cluj (Klausenburg) to Oradia Mare (Grosswardein) and two roads, one from Cluj to Oradia Mare and one from Alba Tulia (Karlsburg) to Zarand, traverse it from east to west." No through communication from north to south exists. The mountains are precipitous and Avram Taucu's resistance in these mountains in 1848 shows that the whole massif forms an excellent barrier, or as you call it an excellent natural frontier. I t is this massif the Rumanian armies wanted to reach in 1916, but had not time to do it owing to Lexitzki's Russian army failure to advance from Bucovina to the Same: valley (Bistrilta), as was specified in the military convention between the Allies and Rumania, and to Mackensen's attack in the Dobrudgea.

If then the frontier were to be traced somewhere between this massif and the Theiss, where a good ethnographical frontier could be established, Greater Rumania would have a four-square boundary, which you say, speaking of Bulgaria (page 75), renders a state territorially compact, with great power of military concentration. The centre of Rumania would be Transylvania, which would constitute a four-faced redoubt of which the sides would be powerful mountains (parapets) of over 3000 feet height. This redoubt would be surrounded : on the east by a long natural glacis ending on the Dniester and Black Sea (Moldavia and Bessarabia) ; on the south by another glacier going to the Danube and Black Sea (Wallachia and Dobrudgea) ; on the west by a very short glacis towards the plain of the Tisa (Theiss).

* The spelling of names in Colonel Rosetti's letter is generally Rumanian, even for the names outside the present boundaries of Rumania : thus Tisa for Tisza (Magyar), or Theiss (German). Klausenburg is the German name for Magyar KolozsvLr ; Gross- urardein is Magyar Nagy-VArad, and Icarlsburg is Magyar Gyulafeh4rvLr.-ED. G . y

It would give Rumania "space and opportunity for internal develop- ment such as may remove all incentive for discontent and desire for encroachment on other preserves" (page 5 ) ; it would be based on " unity of sentiment, expressed in the will of the people concerned, to which we must look as the best guarantee for peaceful settlements within definite boundaries " (page 7 ) ; it assures Rumania " space for fair development " (page 1 1).

I t would certainly make " Rumania the most formidable fighting State in the Near East" (page II~), and that would allow her to form, in alliance with the Jugo-Slavs, the bulwark against any German (and I add Hungarian) aggression in South-Eastern Europe which you advocate (page 55).

I should be very grateful to you if you would agree to have these objections, and any answer you may see fit to make, published in any daily paper. 11. Note by Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich in reply to the Criticisms of Colonel Rosetti.

All loyal Englishmen wish well to Kumania, and I (believing that a strong Rumania would prove a powerful factor in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans) am anxious that the problem of her western boun- dary should be studied from every reasonable point of view. Clearly, since the military strength of Rumania must depend largely on man- power, the acquisition of Transylvania is of the greatest importance, and here I am so much in sympathy with Rumanian aspirations that I have followed Colonel Rosetti's suggestions with the deepest interest. Broadly, he points out the value of a line which, starting from Deva on the hlaros in western Transylvania, north of the Benat, could be carried in a northwesterly direction along a system of mountain divides to the culminating ridges of the Bihor massif, and thence north-east to a junction with the Lapos branch of the Carpathians. The weak points geographically in such a boundary are evidently to be found in the latter section (especially where it crosses the Samos River), whilst its weakness ethnographically is that it leaves to the west a large area within which 95 per cent. of the population is Ruman. I t should be noted, too, that in the Banat, south of the Maros, there is a population majority of Rumans. I n order to include as much of the Ruman people as possible Colonel Rosetti proposes a line somewhere to the west of that traced above, between the line of crests and the Theiss River. This would involve geographical difficulties which I have already pointed out in my book, and which I need not repeat. Colonel Rosetti does not mention the Magyar occupation of a considerable area of Transylvania enclosed in the bend or elbow between the Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps, which, from the ethnographic point of view, is a serious difficulty in the settlement of the Transylvanian problem, especially with the near prospect of a declaration

of independence on the part of the Magyars. All the same I sincerely hope that.Rumanian aspirations may be realized.

As regards the Dobrogea position, may I be permitted to point out that I did not at all overlook the possible advantage to Bulgaria of the occupation of ;territory south of the Danube and directly commanding the weak strategic position afforded by the junction of Wallachia and Moldavia. But there are obviously two ways of regarding the military possibilities which might arise from the advance of a hostile force across the Danube at this point. I t might, of course, happen as Colonel Rosetti suggests, that such a force would be capable of dividing the defensive armies of Wallachia from those of Moldavia, and of defeating then] separately. On the other hand, Provided that the ??iz'Zitarystrength Walachia werefulh deveZojed indetzdent(y of Moldavia, it appears to me that the dividing force would find itself in the awkward predicament of being threatened on both flanks, with the Danube behind it. Colonel Rosetti maintains that Wallachia would have to be abandoned in face of such an advance on the part of Bulgaria. Here I fail to follow him. Why should not Wallachia be rendered capable of defending herself against any such contingency?